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NOFSA statement on generic 
bisphosphonates  
To the Editor: We wish to set the record straight in terms of in-
accurate and irrelevant comments in the National Osteoporosis 
Foundation of South Africa’s letter.1 
NOFSA should have availed themselves of the facts leading 
up to the ‘Notice of rejection’ of an old application which is not 
linked to the current 10 mg and 70 mg registrations (even the 
formulations are different).  The old application was rejected 
precisely because the Medicines Control Council was doing its 
job. They wanted bioequivalence data, and because this was not 
possible in 1998/1999 we attempted to register the product on 
dissolution data alone (based on the unique physicochemical and 
pharmacokinetic properties of alendronate).  The MCC insisted 
on bioequivalence data, which became available later and were 
submitted with the new applications.  
NOFSA admits the ‘limitations’ of the Epstein studies, but 
justifies its inclusion because ‘differences exist in dissolution 
profiles of different alendronate preparations’ and because 
they are ‘the only dissolution data published’.  Cipla Medpro’s 
view is that this statement is not justified.  Firstly, we are led to 
believe that if an article has been published, it does not matter 
how limited, how small, how biased, how irrelevant or how 
flawed it is, it can be ‘reliably referenced’.  Secondly, a Medline 
search would have yielded a number of peer-reviewed publica-
tions on alendronate generics with similar dissolution profiles 
and bioequivalence which should also have been ‘reliably refer-
enced’.2-4  It is important to note that in vitro data alone are not 
sufficient in the case of alendronate to infer in vivo equivalence 
or inequivalence.  Final conclusions on the bioequivalence (and 
interchangeability) of alendronate-containing products need to 
be drawn from properly designed in vivo bioequivalence stud-
ies.  This is why the innovator also chose to use bioequivalence 
data (in normal healthy volunteers), and no additional clinical 
efficacy and safety data, to register a completely different alen-
dronate formulation (their oral solution) in the USA.5
NOFSA’s contention that the MCC has ‘similar concerns 
regarding bioequivalence and lack of information on the long-
term clinical efficacy and safety of generic alendronate prepara-
tions’ puzzles us, as we have no knowledge of such concerns.  
The MCC has never explained or justified the inclusion of 
alendronate on this list.  NOFSA also conveniently uses general 
statements from the MCC’s ‘Generic Substitution’ document as 
if they apply specifically to alendronate.
Furthermore, the Non-Substitutable List is being revised, as 
officially acknowledged by the Registrar.6  Therefore, instead of 
hiding behind the notion that it is ‘the only source of informa-
tion’, NOFSA should rather, in the interest of all osteoporosis 
sufferers in South Africa, be asking why this molecule is on this 
list if there is no compelling scientific reason for its inclusion.
It is evident, from comment on Epstein et al.’s article and 
other publications,7-9 that the mechanism of bisphosphonate 
oesophageal irritation is not yet properly established.  It is far 
more complex than previously thought and probably a combi-
nation of both systemic and pre-systemic effects.  It is therefore 
inappropriate to ascribe the bisphosphonate oesophagitis only 
to its potential ‘pre-systemic’ local irritant effect.
While we acknowledge the expertise of ‘leaders in the field of 
metabolic bone diseases’ and ‘international experts on osteopo-
rosis’, we respectfully submit that these and even clinical phar-
macologists (if not steeped in regulatory matters) are probably 
not appropriate experts on regulatory science.
We accept that the onus is on us to prove the efficacy and 
safety of our product, Osteobon.  We have done this accord-
ing to international norms, standards and guidelines, and this 
is why both the MCC and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) have approved the product.  NOFSA, on the contrary, 
still has no evidence of a lack of efficacy and safety of Osteobon.
It is therefore disturbing that NOFSA chooses to question 
the integrity and credibility of the MCC, who approved the 
efficacy and safety of generic alendronates for the indications 
applied for, and who strive to match the regulatory standards 
of developed countries.  We respectfully suggest that NOFSA 
should rather focus on the goals of its own organisation and 
acknowledge the benefits that generic alendronate can offer to 
the thousands of osteoporosis sufferers in South Africa who 
may not be receiving appropriate treatment due to the high cost 
of medicines.
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Medical Director
Cipla Medpro
Bellville, W Cape
medical@ciplamedpro.co.za
1. National Osteoporosis Foundation of South Africa.  NOFSA statement on generic 
bisphosphonates (Briewe).  S Afr Med J 2006; 96: 758-760.
2. Almeida S, Almeida A, Filipe A, et al. In vitro disintegration and dissolution and in vivo 
bioequivalence of two alendronate once-weekly formulations.  Arzneimittelforschung 2006; 
56(2): 84-89.
3. Lainesse A, Ozalp Y, Wong H, Alpan RS.  Bioequivalence studies on bisphosphonates: the 
example of alendronate.   Arzneimittelforschung 2004; 54(9a): 569-572.
4. Roldan EJ, Quattrocchi O, Zanetti D, et al.  In vitro and in vivo equivalence studies of 
alendronate monosodium tablets.  Arzneimittelforschung 2005; 55(2): 93-101.
5. Fosamax® (Alendronate Sodium) Oral Solution: FDA Approval History.  http://www.fda.
gov/cder/foi/nda/2003/21-575_Fosamax.htm (last accessed 17 October 2006).
6. Hela M, Registrar of Medicines, Medicines Control Council.  Review of the guideline on 
generic substitution (List of Non-Substitutable Medicines).  22.01 Review generic substitution 
Guideline (2.10 Dec03v1) Aug06v1.doc Sept 2006. http://www.mccza.com/documents/
 22.01%20Review%20of%20generic%20substitution%20Guideline%20(%202.10%20Dec03%2
0v1)%20Aug06v2.doc (last accessed 17 October 2006).
7. Bolanos Diaz R.  Comment on disintegration/dissolution profiles of copies of Fosamax 
(alendronate).  Curr Med Res Opin 2004; 20(7): 1035-1036; author reply 1036-1037.  
8. Reszka AA, Halasy-Nagy J, Rodan GA.  Nitrogen-bisphosphonates block retinoblastoma 
phosphorylation and cell growth by inhibiting the cholesterol biosynthetic pathway in a 
keratinocyte model for esophageal irritation.  Mol Pharmacol 2001; 59(2): 193-202.
9. Suri S, Monkkonen J, Taskinen M, et al. Nitrogen-containing bisphosphonates induce 
apoptosis of Caco-2 cells in vitro by inhibiting the mevalonate pathway: a model of 
bisphosphonate-induced gastrointestinal toxicity.  Bone 2001; 29(4): 336-343.
        
BRIEWE
November 2006, Vol. 96, No. 11  SAMJ
Rural doctors given fresh hope
To the Editor: The Izindaba article by Chris Bateman refers.1 It 
was indeed refreshing to hear that we have somebody, in the 
person of Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, Deputy Minister of 
Health, who seems to be understanding and willing to honestly 
face the current crisis in health care and make a commitment to 
action. It is long overdue that someone from the Department of 
Health should come out of the closet of denial and say, ‘These 
are the facts, let’s act on them.’ To boldly and humbly admit 
that we have a problem is the first step towards a solution. Also, 
to be open and willing to acknowledge your mistakes seems to 
be a novel, but praiseworthy, way of conducting politics. The 
response by the Deputy Minister at the recent Rudasa congress 
reminds me of the words of John Ruskin, written in the late 
19th century: ‘Your honesty is not to be based either on religion 
or policy. Both your religion and policy must be based on it.’2 
If the words spoken are followed by the promised action, there 
remains a chance that some of the lost hope and trust in the 
Department of Health may be rekindled.
Vernon Louw
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Paediatric surgery in the Third World
To the Editor: Third-World nations are characterised, if not 
defined, by a colonial past, poverty, poor educational standards, 
particularly among women, and limited health care resources.1   
In most Third-World countries children constitute more than 
half of the population1 and Africa’s population is predicted 
to increase by 1 000 million over the next 45 years, despite 
the ravages of HIV/AIDS, war and famine.2 The number of 
children, including children with surgical disease, will therefore 
increase dramatically. But clinicians attempting to provide 
surgical services to children in Africa are faced with many 
problems including a lack of human and material resources.3 Of 
the world’s least developed countries, 70% are in sub-Saharan 
Africa.1 Debt repayment, housing, education, and social service 
and health provision are near-impossible tasks faced by many 
African countries; some maintain that this confirms Africa’s 
‘basket case’ status.4
Primary health care has rightly been emphasised by cash-
strapped societies, but HIV/AIDS has introduced new 
challenges for communities, clinical practice and health 
economics.  It adds to the internecine battle for resources 
and has become a funding ‘black hole’ from which nothing 
escapes, while secondary and tertiary care, which include 
paediatric surgery, remain underfunded. Yet 85% of children 
in the Third World require surgery of some sort before their 
15th birthday.3 Most require simple surgery that is within the 
compass of appropriately trained general surgeons who must 
provide paediatric surgical services because of the paucity of 
paediatric surgeons in Africa.3 Such ‘multi-skilling’ will remain 
the basis of surgical services in the medium term and mandates 
that the training of general surgeons must include paediatric 
experience, along with obstetric and trauma surgery.5
In Europe there is a paediatric surgeon for every 50 000 
of an ageing population. In South Africa there is only 1 for 
every 2 669 000 people,6 most of whom are children. However 
compared with most African countries, South Africa is enviably 
endowed with paediatric surgeons.5 In the UK there are some 
6 000 live births per annum per paediatric surgeon and in South 
Africa about 35 714.6   
Surgical conditions in children constitute a significant public 
health problem and fully justify an increase in the number of 
appropriately trained surgeons.3 Given the projected increase 
in the number of births, inaction is inexcusable. Clearly it is 
also important to develop nursing services in order to improve 
quality of care and minimise morbidity. Human resource 
difficulties are exacerbated by the loss of trained medical and 
nursing personnel to developed countries. Africa must strive 
harder to retain her academic clinicians and nurses to provide 
tertiary services to African children and training to African 
surgeons.
The tradition of sending surgeons and nurses from former 
colonies to Europe for higher training is expensive and results 
in largely irrelevant experience.  Training for African surgeons 
should take place in Africa where children with relevant 
disorders abound.  Few hospitals can afford to have surgeons 
away from their posts while gaining experience in paediatric 
surgery and fewer surgeons can afford to live without a 
stipend.  Training capacity in Africa exists7 and a growing need 
exists, but this requires funding.  
Europe’s awakening to the relevance of Africa in their own 
development will not solve Africa’s economic problems. 
However this provides an opportunity for governments and 
other funding agencies to confront the looming catastrophe 
and to urgently train and develop surgeons with paediatric 
experience who can deal with the surgical problems of the extra 
1 000 million people to whom Africa will soon be home.
G P Hadley 
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Durban
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Separation-survivability – the elusive 
moral cut-off point?
To the Editor: De Roubaix and Van Niekerk1 correctly point out 
that the utilitarian position holding that fetal life has no value 
cannot be defended, and argue that the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act is ethically deficient because it does not 
accord the fetus any moral significance. The notion of sentience 
as a measure of value is simply not defensible.  Their argument 
that separation-survivability is the absolute moral cut-off point 
for termination of pregnancy is compelling and should inform 
our profession and bring pressure to bear on redrafting this Act. 
A limitation of the paper is that it could not examine the 
moral impact on persons who make a utilitarian decision to end 
a fetal life that was entrusted to their protection.  The potential 
or complete humanity of that life can be denied and the need to 
grieve repressed until some later event confronts such persons 
with its attendant grief and guilt.  Many crises can break this 
cycle of denial, for example divorce or the death of a spouse 
or child, desire that the child from a later pregnancy should 
survive, and the sight of an ultrasound picture of a fetus of the 
same gestational age.  They then discover what Raskolnikov 
found in Dostoyevsky’s novel, Crime and Punishment, when 
he murdered the despicable old woman moneylender: that 
the most apparently useless individuals have value – have 
what theologians call the image of God upon them.  The more 
prolonged the pregnancy, the more profound is this reaction, 
which supports De Roubaix and Van Niekerk’s graded position 
on the value of prenatal life.
Health care workers who have to perform terminations of 
pregnancy face the same feelings of grief and guilt.  That partly 
explains their frequent anger or distant stance taken against 
women seeking abortions – and why so many midwives burn 
out when they are compelled to do this work. Supervisors 
should provide counselling and support, and the opportunity 
to work in another area, rather than a disciplinary response.
Some hold that such grief and guilt are conditioned and 
should not be felt.  Suggesting that the deep nurturing and 
protective drives in humans should not exist is dangerous for 
the effective nurturing of children, the sacrificial love needed 
for marriage, old age, and the sacrificial attitude to the sanctity 
of persons needed to be a good health care worker.
Grief and guilt are distressing to those affected, and 
for persons involved in terminations of pregnancies who 
experience it, healing only comes when it is honestly 
faced. Distress can affect family relationships before help is 
found. There is therefore a moral and ethical imperative of 
thorough counselling of persons seeking an abortion.  None 
should be allowed to undertake it lightly without careful 
evaluation of the cost to their personalities and families.  They 
should be assisted to find solutions to the problems created 
by the pregnancy, and options including adoption or foster 
care, getting employment, counselling of the couple together, 
ensuring maintenance is paid through pregnancy and 
childhood, and securing emergency housing and emergency 
financial aid should be explored. 
No health care worker should be pressured to take part 
in or perform terminations of pregnancy against their 
conscience.  The need for adequate pre-abortion counselling, 
and for health care workers to be free to follow the dictates of 
their conscience in this matter, should be written into any new 
legislation and acknowledged in our present practice.
J V Larsen
Private Bag X010
Howick
3290
jonvl@netactive.co.za
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To the Editor: When arguing for a particular moral position, 
philosophers should provide a fair representation of the 
opponents’ view – and in this case not focus solely on some 
weaknesses of some utilitarians.1 Granted the authors’ right 
to defend their essentially ‘pro-life’ stance, the use of an 
ideological vocabulary, such as feticide, killing and partial 
birth abortion, is disparaging for those who do not share their 
‘pro-life’ position. Defending their own position they talk about 
viable fetuses, neonates, infants, babies and toddlers. It would 
be more appropriate to use the neutral medical vocabulary: 
zygote, embryo, fetus and neonate.
The argument is that ‘separation-survivability is the only 
morally acceptable cut-off point’ after which termination 
of pregnancy is morally unacceptable. The title ends with a 
question mark and adds the qualification that it is elusive (i.e. 
misleading). The argument from viability used as a legal cut-off 
dates back to the Roe v. Wade case in 1973 in the USA. In 1995, 
H J Gert made a philosophical argument against viability as 
a moral cut-off,2 namely, ‘it is far from clear why one’s moral 
status would change as one develops the ability to survive 
on one’s own’. Furthermore, the question was raised how an 
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outside factor such as medical technology can have a bearing 
on one’s moral status? 
In logic, premises are true or false. The conclusion is valid if 
supported by the premises. An argument is sound if it is valid 
and if the premises are true. The authors’ conclusion states: ‘a 
human being that can survive on its own has every right not to 
be killed’.1 A 25-week-neonate cannot survive on its own but 
is entirely dependent on the availability of medical technology 
and expertise. Do the premises support the conclusion?
The argument from potentiality states that from fertilisation 
(rather than conception) the zygote has the potential to 
evolve into a mature and rational human being. Whether this 
materialises or not is irrelevant. It is potential that gives the 
zygote-embryo-fetus its moral standing and the attached right 
to life. The authors reject the argument from sentience – only a 
presentient or insentient embryo-fetus can be aborted3-4 – but 
propose the same gradualist approach (i.e. a pre-person has a 
right to life). In other words, before 25 weeks the embryo-fetus 
has no personhood (but the potential to become a person); from 
25 weeks on it is a pre-person (until when?).
The second premise claims that the world cannot exist with-
out human beings, a characteristically strict anthropomorphic 
position that is easily dispelled by looking at evolution. Man 
is a latecomer on this planet. The premise does not support the 
conclusion and is false.
The third premise is similar to the first, stating that the pre-
person has the same moral importance as the term neonate. A 
pre-person is no more a person in the philosophical sense (i.e. 
rationality, command of language, self-consciousness, control 
or agency, moral worth)5 than a term neonate. The premise only 
states what is the conclusion.
The fourth premise, the moral unacceptability of infanticide, 
is a conclusion and not a premise.
Although the term abortion does not appear in the title, 
the first sentence sets the stage: this is about abortion, which 
is ‘the termination of pregnancy … before the fetus reaches 
viability (currently regarded as 24 weeks in the UK)’.6 Hence, 
a pre-person can be terminated, not aborted. This is not just 
semantics. Termination after viability is usually practised for 
medical indications to prevent harm to the pregnant woman. 
One could even say that this no more morally justified than 
before viability (a topic not really addressed by the authors) 
unless it is from self-defence. However, self-defence requires an 
aggressor and the zygote-embryo-fetus is innocent.
The ‘elusive cut-off’ lends moral support to third-trimester 
fetuses. It illustrates the difficulty to convincingly argue for 
an intermediate position between pro-life and pro-choice. 
Moreover, it can be misleading (elusive). Personhood requires 
individuality; because individuality is not finalised before 
12 weeks, the pre-embryo (much less a clone) cannot be a 
person. We know when personhood ends (irreversible coma, 
permanent vegetative stage), not when it starts. The potential 
for personhood is there from fertilisation; when it actualises is 
less definable. If a sliding scale were to start at 1 and end at 10, 
where on the scale is the pre-person?
Louis-Jacques van Bogaert
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Dr De Roubaix replies: Dr Larsen makes a valid point on the 
necessity of adequate counselling. A grieving process similar 
to that following bereavement may occur after spontaneous 
and interventional abortion, since strong maternal bonds may 
be present before 12 weeks’ gestation.1 Moreover, spouses and 
partners may also experience a feeling of loss. Grieving is more 
likely following spontaneous than therapeutic abortion, and 
I would expect this to apply to TOP as well, when pregnancy 
is unplanned and unwelcome. But because of the complexity 
that surrounds termination and the need for rapid decision 
and action, guilt feelings may surface even some time after 
termination. Therefore counselling should be mandatory (at 
present Act 92 of 1996, the TOP act, only recommends it), 
though of course it would be difficult for the State to comply.
Dr Van Bogaert seems to be generally critical, with 
accusations of one-sidedness, that we attempt to support a pro-
life position, the ideological use of vocabulary and the use of 
the word ‘elusive’ in the title. He is critical of the survivability 
cut-off argument, misunderstands our position on survivability, 
criticises the logic of our argument and voices some of the 
problems with the intermediate position on abortion. Our 
article is not a comprehensive critique of utilitarianism, whose 
concept of personhood has rendered influential support to the 
arguments for free choice in abortion (even though the central 
argument is female reproductive autonomy, as Act 92 of 1996 
clearly sets out in the preamble). Peter Singer,2 Michael Tooley3 
and John Harris4  freely concede that consistent application 
of their personhood argument has the inevitable problematic 
of legitimising the killing of neonates since they, too, are 
not yet moral persons. This concession enables criticism of 
their argument, but that does not mean that we are pro-life 
in the accepted sense. Van Bogaert may have misread, or 
misunderstood, our argument. We believe that termination 
is always a moral matter, but also that the moral significance 
of prenatal life is not necessarily absolute and should be 
contextualised against a variety of other arguments. We do 
not argue that every pregnancy should necessarily proceed to 
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term, only that separation survivability might be a moral cut-off 
beyond which termination should only rarely be legitimate.
We have not intended to use any term pejoratively or as 
an ideological argument, as Van Bogaert seems to deduce. 
Though words often simply have meanings we ascribe to them, 
I take the word ‘elusive’ to mean ‘difficult to find or catch, to 
understand’, not ‘misleading’ as Van Bogaert suggests.5  
The argument concerning separation-survivability actually 
precedes Roe v. Wade, which was a legal, not a moral position, 
such as ours, and not enforceable. The court suggested as a 
compromise that States of the Union, who so wished, could use 
separation-survivability as a cut-off to abortion. Several States 
allowed ‘termination’ of the fetus during labour at the crowning 
of the head, before it was actually delivered and became a 
‘person’ with legally protected rights. President George B Bush 
recently stopped this. In response to Gert’s supposition we 
suggest a moral coincidence between the separation-survivable 
fetus and the neonate, and that some of the recognition 
accorded the latter might also be applicable to the former. 
This is in accordance with general societal intuitions and legal 
practice, and may not be as inconsequential as Van Bogaert 
seems to think, since there are societies where termination of 
third-trimester fetuses is not frowned upon. As to the question 
about the influence of ‘outside factors’ on morality, is it not 
what responsible applied ethics is all about – the application 
of context and circumstance to moral thoughts and deeds? The 
challenge to bioethics is that we constantly attempt to make 
moral sense out of the application of (often new and innovative) 
scientific knowledge. Humankind is characterised by a constant 
inquisitive involvement with the world that surrounds us and 
with which we are inextricably entwined.
As to Van Bogaert’s criticism of the construction of our 
argument, the point is not that a 25-week fetus is necessarily 
separation-survivable; whatever the cut-off, we suggest 
that such a point exists. Our quest was to examine its moral 
significance. We do not disregard the moral significance of 
sentience, but separation-survivability probably precedes 
its advent, and the latter, not sentience (which it obviously 
would acquire later) would determine the fetus’s possibility of 
entering into and survival in the world.
Van Bogaert’s position on potentiality is unclear. It is certainly 
a significant argument, with three qualifications. Firstly, it needs 
to be of a moral nature (be human potentiality with the definite 
endpoint of the creation of a person capable of moral thoughts 
and deeds). Secondly, it is only relevant once twinning has 
ceased to be possible, since only then can one sensibly refer to 
the potentiality of a particular identifiable individual. Thirdly, 
extrinsic potentiality, i.e. a favourable environment in which 
to develop, is as important in our conception of potentiality 
as intrinsic, i.e. genetic, potentiality. We draw on insights 
from existential phenomenology to posit that speciesism (in 
a moderate guise) expresses fundamental aspects of human 
self-understanding and consequent self-esteem. The human 
species is essential for the possibility of sense-making and sense 
constitution in and of the world through its particular use of 
what Popper called the ‘higher functions’ of language.  Without 
the essentially human phenomenon of valuation, a function of 
a personal reflective mode of being, in terms of which ethics 
and morality occurs in our world, it would be impossible to 
develop a consistent moral argument. The very possibility 
of morality is therefore dependent on humanity, arguments 
that some primates express (a rudimentary form of) morality 
notwithstanding. Of course this is anthropocentric, but can any 
animal, or can we, sensibly, convincingly argue to the contrary? 
But note that this is not an absolute ‘right to life’ argument 
for all ‘human beings’ (like anencephalic fetuses, irreversible 
comatose patients, etc.); nor is it an argument against ‘animal 
rights’ or in favour of cruelty to animals. It simply means that 
favouring ‘our’ species is inevitable for our mode of being.
I concede the moral challenge of the ‘middle road’, which 
in part motivated our article. But in practice many supporters 
of free choice actually follow this path, since they generally 
reject ‘late’ (third-trimester) termination and argue that one 
or more characteristics acquired during pregnancy preclude 
termination beyond a certain point. Individuation is usually 
regarded as having been confirmed at gastrulation (endometrial 
implantation). Psychological personhood, usually defined as 
the ability to value one’s life, to be self-conscious, to be aware 
of one self as some sort of continuing substance of existence, is 
gradually attained some time after birth. We argue that in Van 
Bogaert’s idiom perhaps 5 out of 10 is adequate for a ‘right to 
life’.
These matters will be dealt with more systematically and 
comprehensively, and the applicable philosophical arguments 
developed more extensively, in our forthcoming article in the 
South African Journal of Philosophy.
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